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ABSTRACT
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 mandated a series of
tax rate reductions for the period 1982-1984. They represented
the most significant changes in the tax rate structure in nearly
two decades. This paper considers the response of taxpayers to
these cuts and extends these results to estimate the revenue
maximizing top tax rate for the personal income tax.
The methodological emphasis of this paper is to create a
baseline Income distribution to describe what level and
distribution of Income could be expected in the absence of tax
changes. This baseline is then compared with actual tax return
data to measure the change in taxpayer behavior. Throughout
this study the National Bureau of Economic Research's TAXSIM
model was used to perform the detailed microsimulation work.
This paper finds that at least one sixth, and probably one
quarter, of the revenue loss ascribable to the 1981 tax law
changes was recouped by changes In taxpayer behavior over the
period 1982-1984. It concludes that under the tax base of that
period, federal income tax revenue would be maximized at a tax
rate of about 35 percent, and total income tax revenue maximized
at a total tax rate of 40 percent. The findings also suggest
that personal income averaged as much as 2 percent higher than
it otherwise would have been as a result of the behavioral
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The possibility that marginal tax rates and tax revenue may
be inversely related is at least as old as the Wealth of
Nations. Adam Smith argued:
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the
consumption of the taxed commodities, and
sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently
afford a smaller revenue to government than
what might be drawn from more modest taxes.1
Most modern economic analyses of taxation have tended to
neglect the relationship between rates and revenue and have
instead focussed on the issue of excess burden. However, the
response of the tax base, and therefore of revenue, to changes
in tax rates has two important economic implications.
First, if the tax base varies with the level of rates
imposed upon it, there exists a tax rate above which revenues
start to decrease. Given the usual objective of tax design as
minimizing the excess burden of taxation subject to a revenue
constraint, tax rates above the revenue maximizing level are
irrelevant to consideration. At the point of revenue
maximization, the excess burden of collecting an additloinal
dollar approaches infinity, far above any likely shadow price of
government revenue. Therefore, the revenue maximizing- rate
provides an upper bound on the range of socially optimal tax
rates.—— 2——
Second,the response of taxpayers to changes in tax rates
has important implications for fiscal policy regardless of the
level of rates. The fact that the tax base will be smaller at
high rates than at low rates is not a controversial conclusion.
This result Implies that a given percentage change in tax rates
will necessarily produce a smaller percentage change in tax
revenue. For example, a 10 percent income tax surcharge will
not result in 10 percent more tax revenue even if the
macroeconomic implications of the policy change are discounted.
Empirical estimation of the magnitude of this effect is
therefore necessary for the proper conduct of fiscal policy.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the response of
taxpayers to changes in U.S. personal income tax rates and
extend the results to predict the likely maximizing rate of
personal income taxation. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act
provided a 23 percent reduction in tax rates over 3 years and an
immediate cut in the top personal rate from 70 percent to 50
percent. The experience from these years provides the data for
this investigation.
The first section of this paper deals with the
methodological issues involved In investigating the behavioral
response of taxpayers to changes in tax rates. The second
section provides data from the period on the size of the tax
base and its variation with rates.In the third section, these—— 3——
resultsare extended to estimate the revenue maximizing top
personal income tax rate and the effect of the tax rate
reductions on the size of personal income.
I. Methodological Issues
The objective of this analysis is to isolate the behavioral
response of taxpayers to changes in tax rates. This analysis
begins with a simple model of the tax system. A given taxpayer
pays tax Ti on taxable income Y1. The marginal tax rate on
this income, t is represented by the derivative of the tax
function at the given level of taxable income:
(la) T =T(Y1)
(ib) t1 =T'(Y1)
The level of taxable income declared by the taxpayer is a
function of his endowment and underlying tastes, X1, and a
choice by him of how much of his endowment to convert into
taxable income. This underlying endowment can be viewed as the
amount of income a taxpayer would earn in the absence of taxes.
The choice of how much of ones endowment to convert into income
and pay taxes on is dependent upon the share of each additional
dollar of taxable income which the taxpayer is allowed to keep,
1-ti, which will be called the taxpayer's after—tax share.
(2) Y(Xi,1_ti)
The methodological problem is to isolate the tax effect from
the effect of a taxpayer's endowment. For this purpose,
intertemporal comparisons are not useful. A number of
authors2 have noted that the share of taxable income reported—— 4——
byhigh income taxpayers rose with the reduction of the top tax
rate from 70 percent in 1981 to 50 percent in 1982. They take
this as an indication of a behavioral response to the lower
rates.
But, this need not be the case. The distribution of
taxpayer endowments, X, may well have changed between the two
years in question. For example, interest income reached a
record share of personal income in 1982 due to high interest
rates. Since the distribution of interest income is skewed
toward the top of the distribution, the record amount of
interest received alone would raise the share of taxable income
reported by upper income taxpayers. Thus, the valuation of
taxpayer endowment must be made given the macroeconomic
environment of the year the taxable Income is reported.
A second methodological issue involves a problem of data
limitation. The behavior of individual taxpayers is not
observable in the years after the tax cut. Even given a copy of
the taxpayer's tax return, the taxpayer's endowment cannot be
determined independent of his taxable income. An estimate of a
taxpayer's endowment must therefore come from some source which
is independent of the calculation of the taxpayer's taxable
income for the year in question.
A final point to stress is that the response of taxable
income to tax rates is not the same as the response of labor
supply or other real economic factors. The response of taxable
income includes, but is by no means limited to these factors.
Existing parameters on labor supply response, for example, are
not applicable to the problem at hand.-- 5--
Instead,the response of taxable income to tax rates
Includes a variety of decisions by the taxpayer, some of which
are independently documented. For example, the sensitivity of
capital gains realizations to tax rates has been documented by
Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki34, Lindsey5, and the
Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis6, among others.
Clotfelter7 has suggested a strong relationship between the
after—tax price and the use of business travel and entertainment
deductions. Numerous authors8 have indicated a high
elasticity of charitable contributions to the after-tax price.
The myriad decisions which affect taxable income coupled
with uncertainty regarding actual parameter estimates, and
questions about possible interdependence of these various
decisions mean that the overall response of the income tax base
to tax rates cannot be determined from the existing literature.
In this regard, studies such as Fullerton's9 which used a
highly sophisticated general equilibrium model based on known
parameter values of factor supply elasticity, do not capture the
full response of the tax base.
A. Baseline Income Distributions
One method for surmounting these methodological problems is
to create a baseline income distribution similar to those used
by government technicians to estimate tax revenue In future
years°. The baseline distributions used by revenue
estimators incorporate the projected macroeconomic environment
of the year being estimated with taxpayer behavior based on the—- 6--
existingtax regime.In effect, these projections assume that
the value of taxpayer endowments will change with the overall
economy but that the effects of tax rates changes are nil.
Changes in the relative value of taxpayer endowments are
primarily the result of changes in the functiona1 distribution
of income in society. This functional distribution, as defined
by the National Income and Product Accounts, Is part of the
forecast of macroeconomic conditions which revenue estimators
use.In the case of this study, the macroeconomic conditions
and functional distribution of income in the years being studied
are known, so the forecast error inherent in revenue projections
to future years is eliminated.
Therefore, the baseline revenue estimate is an historic
counterfactual which assumes the actual level of taxpayer
endowments In a given year, but that taxpayer behavior given
those endowments reflects an earlier tax regime. Variations
between the counterfactual level of taxable income and the
actual level cannot be attributed to changes in the relative
value of endowments due to macroeconomic conditions, but must be
associated either with the change in tax regime, or some other
change not apparent in the economic data for the period.
If the baseline represents the true underlying distribution
of endowments, differences between the baseline and actual
distribution of taxable income may be ascribed to changes in
after tax shares. Using an *todenote the baseline level of
taxable income and the pre—tax cut tax rate on which the
baseline is based:—— 7——
(3)Y*1
=Y(X1,1_t*1)
(4)Y1 / j* =F(1_t1/1_t*1)
A check on the validity of a model of baseline income
distribution is provided in years when there were no significant
tax changes. In those years, the baseline and actual
distributions of taxable income should be quite close and the
two fractions in equation 4 should both approach unity. The
present study examines 1980 and 1981 tax payments predicted by
the baseline: two years in which tax changes were relatively
insignificant as a prelude to examining later years.
The use of a baseline income distribution also solves the
methodological need for independent sources for the level of
taxable income and the estimate of taxpayer endowment. The
baseline is constructed from taxpayer behavior in a different
year than the year for which taxable income is reported. To
maintain this independence, the adjustment of the level of
taxpayer endowments to a later year must be made with data from
some source other than tax data, such as the National Income and
Product Accounts.
Finally, a baseline includes all of the income parameters
which determine taxable income. Estimates of the response of
taxable income to changes in tax rates are therefore not limited
to a few changes In factor supply, but include the whole range
of taxpayer adjustments to a new tax regime.
B. The National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM Model
In order to create a baseline income distribution, this
study used the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM—— 8——
model.This model, like the Tax Calculator used by the
Department of Treasury, combines a large data base of actual tax
returns and computerized representations of tax codes for
different years. The model is specifically designed to permit
calculation of baseline income distributions for different years
for the purposes of revenue estimation.
The data base used for this study is the 1979 Individual Tax
Model File Public Use Sample compiled by the Internal Revenue
Service. This file contains roughly 100 data items from the tax
returns of a stratified random sample of some 100,000
taxpayers. Due to cost considerations, this study used a one in
four random sample from the tax file.
This data base reflects the relationship between taxable
income and endowment given 1979 macroeconomic conditions and the
tax regime prevailing in that year. That tax regime is the one
that was in place prior to the passage of ERTA in 1981, and is
sufficiently in advance of the political events which produced
the tax cuts that taxpayers can be assumed not to have
anticipated the rate reductions. Therefore, a baseline
distribution created from this 1979 source and adjusted to
reflect the macroeconomic conditions of later years reflects
what taxpayer behavior would have been had no tax change been
passed.
The creation of baseline distributions for later years
involves a process known as "aging". TAXSIM raises the value of
each income term on each of the tax returns to reflect the rise
in the per—tax return level of that type of income in the—- 9-—
NationalIncome and Product Accounts between 1979 and the year
in question. The sample weights attached to each tax return are
then increased to reflect the rise in the number of tax returns
between the two years.
This aging technique permits the income distribution in
society to change with changes in the functional distribution of
income while maintaining the frequency distribution of each
individual component of income.It also divides the total
growth of each component of income into return-intensive and
return-extensive portions. Thus, if a given growth of nominal
income is largely due to inflation and not to expanding real
economic activity, the number of tax returns would stay constant
and the income growth would be reflected in rising incomes on
each return. On the other hand, real economic growth tends to
expand the number of tax returns, thus spreading the growth in
nominal income rather than concentrating it on existing tax
returns. A comparison of the actual and predicted levels of
each component of income is presented in Table 1.
For most of the line items on a tax return, the predicted
level for a given year was the 1979 level times the ratio of
personal income in the modelled year to personal income in
1979. Specific components of income which nay have changed at a
different pace than overall personal income were targetted
separately. For example, wages and salaries were increased by
the ratio of wage and salary income in the modelled year to wage
and salary income in 1979. Business income was given similar
treatment with the target level provided by non—farm proprietor-- 10
Table 1
Actual and Predicted Levels of Income by Component































































































All dollar figures in billions








Numberof 1980 29.52 28.95




income.Dividend income was targetted to the level of dividends
paid in the personal income in each year. All of these income
items are components of personal income in the National Income
and Product Accounts.
Table 1 shows that in the case of wage and salary income and
business income, the aggregate level reported on tax returns
closely followed the predicted level based on the National
Income and Product Accounts. This was not the case for dividend
income.In 1980, the NIPA based prediction underestimated
actual dividend income by about 8 percent while the NIPA based
prediction overestimated dividend income on tax returns by 12
percent in 1984. The NIPA level of personal dividend income
includes dividends which accrue to taxpayers via pension funds
and similar non—taxed entities. These data suggest that the
share of dividends received in non-taxed entities increased over
time. This time trend was not taken into account in creating
the baseline predictions.
Research shows that the reverse process occurs with respect
to interest income. The share of personal interest income as
reported by the National Income and Product Accounts which was
reported on tax returns was only 27 percent in 1979. By 1984 it
grew to 39 percent. Stated differently, aging interest income
from a 1979 base would have led to an underprediction of
interest income of over 30 percent by 1984. A key reason for
this change was the deregulation of the banking industry, and
particularly the emergence of money market mutual funds and the
extension of NOW accounts nationwide. As a result, non-—— 12——
Institutionalpersonal savings received a sharply higher rate of
return.
To model this, the components of household saving in the
Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds were broken Into two
groups: market rate and non—market rate accounts. Certificates
of deposit, bonds, and money market mutual funds were grouped In
the former category while other accounts were placed in the
latter category. An average of current 3 month rates, 6 month
rates lagged one year and 5 year rates lagged 2 years was
selected as an estimate of the composite interest rate on the
market category. Other funds were assigned an average 3.3
percent rate of return regardless of the year in question. The
resulting series closely tracks the actual level of interest
reported on tax returns.
It should be noted that this modelling procedure with regard
to dividends and interest has the effect of understating the
behavioral response of taxpayers to the tax cuts. Retaining a
NIPA basis for dividends overstates dividend income, which is
concentrated in upper income groups, thus reducing the apparent
increase in taxable income for these groups. Similarly, using
an alternative measure for interest raises the predicted value
of this type of income, also concentrated among upper income
taxpayers, thus minimizing the apparent behavioral response.
Capital gains is not a component of income In the National
Income and Product Accounts, so no estimate could be derived
from that source. Instead, the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of
Funds was used to measure tradeable household wealth. This—- 13—-
wealth,including stocks, real estate, and business equity, has
been found to be almost exactly proportional to capital gains
realizations after controlling for tax rate changes.12 On
average, 12 percent of tradeable household wealth was realized
as capital gains for the period 1965-1980. This figure was then
applied to tradeable wealth in later years to obtain a predicted
value. As a result, the capital gains estimate was roughly 6
percent below the actual level in the two years before the rate
reduction, but well below the target after the rate reduction.
Two further adjustments are made to the data base to reflect
changing economic conditions. The sample weight of taxpayers
reporting unemployment compensation is adjusted to reflect the
unemployment rate in later years. While slow economic growth
reduces the number of new entrants to the labor force and the
growth in the number of tax returns, it also reduces the labor
income of existing workers due to temporary unemployment. These
workers will file tax returns, but their income is reduced below
the level it otherwise would have been. This adjustment for
unemployment changes the distribution of particular components
of income and thus complements the changes in the income
distribution due to changes in the functional distribution which
have already been made.
The second adjustment to the data involves increasing the
sample weight of taxpayers who itemize their Income tax
deductions to reflect the higher level of income in the year to
which the data Is being aged. As the income level of the
taxpayers In the original 1979 data base rises in the aging—- 14——
process,the deductions for state and local taxes, interest
payments, charitable contributions and medical payments also
rise.If these taxpayers were not originally itemizers, the
data base does not contain information on the taxpayer's
spending on these activities. TAXSIM adjusts for this by
imputing a level of itemized deductions for itemizers and
increasing the sample weight of returns with itemized deductions
to reflect the Increased probability of itemizing for taxpayers
at each nominal income level. These adjustments are based on
actual tax return data. The data on this are provided in table
1.
C.Implications of Baseline Methodology
It should be noted that this aging procedure has the effect
for most types of income of limiting the measured behavioral
response of taxpayers to changes in the distribution of income,
but not its level. The objective in the aging process follows
an approach developed by Deming13. If we definenik as the
amount of income of type j received by taxpayers in group k in
the original 1979 data andmk as the corresponding amount the
taxpayer receives after the extrapolation to a later year, we
minimize:
(5) E (mk -jk)jk subject to Z mik =m
Solution of a set of equations such as (5) for each type of
income produces a set of extrapolation values which involve an—— 15——
equiproportionateincrease for all, taxpayers for a given type of
income, but different extrapolation values for different types
of income.
If the extrapolation value for a particular type of income
equals the aggregate growth in that type of income reported on
tax returns then a comparison of baseline and actual incomes
produces:
(6)EY.k=Ey*k k k
A behavioral response to tax rate reductions in say, group 1,
means that - isgreater than 0. The constraint
expressed in equation 5 implies that the baseline must exceed
the actual value in some other groups by a similar amount.
Figure 1 shows this graphically. The ratio Yik/Y*jk Is
compared to the ratio of the after tax shares (1_t)/(l_t*), as
modelled by equation 4.If there were no behavioral response to
the tax rate change, the data would be arrayed along the
horizontal line indicating a ratio of actual to baseline income
of unity.If we assume that the reporting of taxable Income is
positively related to after tax share, then any behavioral
response would have this horizontal line as a lower bound. A
"True Behavioral Response" line is therefore drawn as a positive
function of the ratio of after tax shares with an intercept of
the income axis at unity.
The constraint expressed by equation 6 means that this true








anyarea above the line indicating an income ratio of unity must
be offset by an equal area below the same line. But, if the
function F represents the true behavior of taxpayers, then
equation 7 must also hold.If t*k Is greater than tk for
all k, then the value for Y imposed by equation 6 is an
overstatement of the true value.In turn, this implies an
intercept of the observed behavioral response below the
theoretical lower bound for such a response.
(7) E Yjk =E (1 —tk)I(1—t*k)
The interpretation of this intercept follows from the
description of the baseline methodology provided above. The
incomes of all taxpayers were increased equiproportionately with
the rate of increase determined by the actual level of income in
the year being modelled. This rate of increase thus included
the behavioral response of taxpayers to the rate reduction. As
the rate reduction affected taxpayers differentially, the
response also varied among taxpayers, with taxpayers getting big
rate cuts having a bigger response. However, the baseline
allocated this differential response equally among all
taxpayers. Taxpayers with small rate reductions were thus
assigned overly large baseline incomes which Included the
average behavioral response of' all taxpayers to the rate
reductions.
Graphically, the Intercept represents how much the baseline
overstated income for someone who had no rate reduction. Since—— 18—-
thisoverstatement of income was proportional in all income
groups, the intercept describes how much lower the
counterfactual level of income was than it should have been
given no tax rate reductions. Alternatively, the reciprocal of
the intercept, reduced by unity, measures the proportionate
increase in income due to taxpayer response to the rate
reductions. This interpretation assumes that the positive
behavioral response by taxpayers with a large increase in their
after—tax share did not cause a corresponding decline in the
incomes received by taxpayers with proportionately smaller rate
reductions. Stated differently, this interpretation assumes
that the receipt of income is not a zero sum game and that the
aggregate level of income is determined, at least in part, by
tax rates.
II. Rates, Revenue, and the Tax Base 1980-1984
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) provided for a
series of reductions in tax rates over the four year period 1981
—1984.It also reduced the size of the tax base by two
statutory provisions: the extension of Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) to virtually all working taxpayers, and a
partial exclusion of income for married couples where both
spouses worked --thetwo earner deduction. The effect of these
provisions on tax liability is summarized on Table 2.
The table presents taxpayers in 4 different income groups.
These groups are defined by the taxpayers reporting Adjusted
Gross Income of a particular size in a particular year according—— 19-—
tothe Statistics of Income for that year. For example, in
1980, the Statistics of Income reported 117,250 taxpayers with
AGI in excess of $200,000. In order to compare identically
situated taxpayers for the baseline prediction, TAXSIM selected
the top 117,250 taxpayers ranked by AGI for comparison. Similar
rankings were done for each income group in each year. Under
this procedure taxpayers placed in an income class in the
baseline did not necessarily have AGI in the specified range.
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the taxes and incomes
of taxpayers situated in Identical places In two different
income distributions. This approach avoids the problems
inherent in other analyses which compare taxpayers in a given
income range even though those taxpayers differ in number and in
location In the income distribution.
In each year, the first row is the tax liability predicted
by TAXSIM under pre-ERTA tax law for the given class of
taxpayers. The second row is TAXSIM's prediction for that group
of taxpayers under ERTA. The percentage difference between
these two numbers is TAXSIM's measure of the percent tax cut
under the ERTA legislation. The fourth row is the actual amount
of taxes paid by the taxpayer group. This is then contrasted
with the predicted level of taxes in row 2, and the percent
difference is reported in the fifth row.
This final row represents the percent difference in taxes
paid by the group not ascribable to changes in the legislation,
or to changes in taxpayer endowments caused by changes in the
aggregate level or functional distribution of income in the—— 20——
Table2
Tax Payments by Taxpayer Groups 1980 -1984
Year and Group 1Group 2Group 3Group 4 All
Estimate "200 +""50-200""30-50" "under 30" Taxpayers
1980
Old Law (P) $19.42 $58.05 $68.06$101.94 $247.47
New Law (P) 19.42 58.05 68.06 101.94 247.47
% Tax Cut 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Actual Tax 19.46 59.17 69.95 101.76 250.34
S Difference +0.2% +1.9% +2.8% —0.2% +1.2%
1981
Old Law (P) $ 22.63$ 75.11 $85.96$106.45$290.15
New Law (P) 22.55 74.22 84.12 103.83 284.72
S Tax Cut —0.4% —1.1% -2.1% -2.5% —1.9%
Actual Tax 21.74 72.52 86.59 103.28 284.13
S Difference -3.6% -2.3% +2.9% -0.5% —0.2%
1982
Old Law (P) $ 25.95$ 80.92$ 95.64$108.50 $311.01
New Law (P) 22.44 69.79 81.24 93.29 266.76
S Tax Cut -14.5% —14.8% —15.1% -14.0% —14.2%
Actual Tax 26.62 72.36 85.00 93.62 277.60
S Difference +18.6% +3.7% +4.6% +0.4% +4.1%
1983
Old Law (P) $ 29.01 $93.30$105.33$112.69$340.33
New Law (P) 23.52 72.79 80.78 88.81 265.90
S Tax Cut —19.0% -22.0% —23.3% —21.2% -21.9%
Actual Tax 31.73 75.76 82.63 84.06 274.18
S Difference +34.9% +4.1% +2.3% —5.3% +3.1%
1984
Old Law (P) $34.11$116.00$117.33$118.35$385.79
New Law (P) 27.04 85.47 85.22 88.39 286.12
S Tax Cut —20.7% —26.3% —27.4% -25.3% —25.8%
Actual Tax 42.11 92.00 86.43 83.43 303.97
S Difference +55.7% +7.6% +1.4% —5.6% +6.2%
Dollar Figures in Billions—— 21——
particularyear. This paper terms this final row, marked %
Difference, as the "revenue response". This response may be
attributed either to the rate reductions or to some unobserved
phenomenon not indicated in either the level or functional
distribution of income.
A. The Revenue Response 1980 -1984
1980. The Economic Recovery Tax Act was not passed until
1981. Thus, the "Old Law" and "New Law" estimates of revenue
presented in table 1 are identical. The data are presented to
show the predictive ability of the TAXSIM model. A comparison
of the actual taxes paid and the predictive level shows an
underestimate by TAXSIM of 1.2 percent. By contrast, a
Congressional Budget Office study14 of the forecasting ability
of the Treasury Tax Calculator shows an average error due to
"technical" factors of 1.4 percent for the 3 years preceding the
passage of ERTA. Neither Treasury nor CBO has presented data on
the average error by income group. TAXSIM missed the tax
liability of particular groups by amounts ranging from 0.2
-percentto 2.8 percent.
1981. ERTA was passed in the summer of 1981. The law
provided for rate reductions of 1.25 percent for the year for
taxpayers using the regular tax computation techniques. In
addition, the top tax rate on capital gains income was reduced
to 20 percent for all assets sold after June 8, 1981. The net
effect of these changes Is shown as the percent tax cut on line
3. The legislated tax reduction at the top of the Income
distribution was less than average because alternative tax—— 22——
computationssuch as the minimum tax were unaffected and the tax
reduction was limited to unearned income for taxpayers filing
under the maximum tax provisions. On the other hand, taxpayers
in lower income groups are the primary beneficiaries of the tax
credits in the code including the earned income credit and the
residential energy credit. The 1.25 percent tax reduction was
applied before credits were considered, so the average reduction
in taxes after credits would exceed 1.25 percent.
TAXSIM overestimated the tax revenue in this year by 0.2
percent. The overestimate was greatest at the top of the income
distribution. One cause of the overestimation was a data
limitation. We have no data on what fraction of capital gains
were realized after the top capital gains was reduced in
mid-year. We therefore computed tax for these upper income
taxpayers assuming no rate reduction on capital gains, thus
overestimating the tax liability of upper income taxpayers.
1981 also contained the possibility of a behavioral response
to the tax rate reductions. Overall, the 1.25 percent reduction
was relatively negligible, raising the after—tax share for
someone in the 30 percent bracket from 70 cents to 70.375 cents
or a bit more than one half of one percent. However, taxpayers
were aware that marginal rates would be substantially lower in
1982, and had an incentive to postpone income and accelerate
deductions from income. This effect would be greatest for
taxpayers in the top income tax bracket of 70 percent, who could
anticipate a reduction to 50 percent in the next tax year. This
may provide a further explanation for why taxes paid by upper
income groups were over predicted for 1981.—— 23--
Bycontrast, the Treasury model's prediction of revenue in
1981 was high by 1.4 percent in its 1978 and 1979 estimates, and
high by 1.8 percent in its 1980 estimate of 1981 revenue after
controlling for the effect of macroeconomic conditions and tax
law changes. Again, the TAXSIM model is well within the
predictive range of the model used to determine fiscal policy at
the Department of Treasury.15
1982. The Economic Recovery Tax Act provided for tax rates
in 1982 to be 10 percent lower than before the tax cut was
passed.In addition, the top tax rate was constrained to being
no more than 50 percent. The 1982 provisions also extended the
Individual Retirement Account provisions to nearly all taxpayers
with labor income. Taxpayers could contribute up to $2000 of
labor income to an IRA and reduce their Adjusted Gross Income by
that amount. In addition, married couples with both spouses
working were allowed to reduce their AG! by 5 percent of the
earnings of the lower earning spouse.
These changes make comparison of taxpayers in the same AG!
groups in different years tricky. Taxpayers with Identical
gross earnings tn 1981 and 1982 could have AGIs with as much as
a $7000 different between the two years. This paper avoids this
analytic problem by matching identically situated taxpayers
under a consistent definition of AG!.
The data show that these tax changes resulted in a roughly
proportional tax reduction for all taxpayer groups of about 14
percent. Middle class taxpayers saw a particularly large tax
reduction due to the IRA and two-earner deduction provisions.-— 24——
However,these latter provisions provided comparatively little
marginal tax rate relief, providing instead a substantial infra—
marginal tax reduction.
A comparison of the level of revenues predicted by TAXSIM
and the actual level of tax revenue shows that actual revenue
was substantially above the predicted level.In the aggregate,
roughly $11 billion more was collected than predicted. As the
total tax reduction in 1982 was about $44 billion, one quarter
of the expected tax reduction was recouped due to a revenue
response. More to the point, the rate reduction portion of the
tax cut of 1982 was roughly $32 billion.In this case, about
one third of the cost of the rate reduction was recouped.
The Treasury model again predicted a non-behavioral revenue
estimate very similar to TAXSIM's. In the three annual
forecasts prior to 1982, Treasury underestimated actual 1982
revenues by 1.7 percent, 4.6 percent, and 5.1 percent
respectively after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and
tax law changes.16 The average 3.8 percent underestimate
amounts to $10.55 billion, almost exactly the $10.84 billion
underestimate of actual revenue in the TAXSIM estimate. Again,
the counterfactual revenue estimates by TAXSIM prove to be
extremely close to those made by the Department of Treasury.
Roughly 40 percent of the extra $11 billion of tax revenue
collected could be found in the top taxpayer group, representing
the top 170,000 taxpayers. These taxpayers paid taxes under the
new law of $26.6 billion.By contrast, the TAXSIM prediction of
the taxes owed by the top 170,000 in 1982 was only $22.4 billion-— 25—-
underthe new law and $26.0 billion under the old tax law.
These findings imply that these taxpayers actually paid more
revenue under the new tax regime than we would expect to have
collected from them under the old higher set of tax rates. For
this group, the reduction in the top rate from 70 percent to 50
percent was costless to the government.
This top taxpayer group is probably both more tax conscious
and more able to control taxable income than other income
groups. Some taxable items such as capital gains are purely
discretionary. Similarly, compensation packages for both high
income employees and for self employed taxpayers may be largely
discretionary in the level of taxable compensation received.
Although the revenue response was greatest in the top income
group, it was not negligible in other groups.In the second
taxpayer group, representing the next 4.34 million taxpayers
that year, tax revenues were $2.5 billion more than expected.
This amounted to a revenue response equal to 23 percent of the
tax reduction legislated for these taxpayers. In the third
taxpayer group, an extra $3.7 billion was collected, or 26
percent of the legislated tax reduction.
In viewing this data, it is important to keep two factors in
mind. First, as Figure 1 demonstrated, the baseline income and
tax numbers overpredict what actually would have occurred in the
absence of the tax rate reductions. The revenue response to the
rate reductions, the percent difference, is therefore greater
for all income groups than the amount shown.
Second, given the errors normal to simulation work in years
when no tax rate changes occurred, it may be possible that the-- 26—-
changesfor these latter two groups represent technical error
rather than a true taxpayer response. The magnitude of these
changes, excluding the factor mentioned above, Is only about 1.5
times the maximum errors in years when no tax changes, or only
minor tax changes, occurred.
Technical error is not a very plausible explanation for the
18.6 percent difference in taxes for the top taxpayer group,
however. This difference is 5 times the maximum difference for
any other group in any other year. The strong likelihood exists
that this difference, which is not explicable by changes in the
number of taxpayers in the group, or by the level or functional
distribution of income, represents a clear response of taxpayers
to lower tax rates.
1983. The 1981 tax bill legislated further rate reductions
for 1983, bringing tax rates 19 percent below their pre-tax cut
level. The top rate was again constrained to be no more than 50
percent. Furthermore, the two earner deduction was increased
from 5 percent of the lower earning spouse's wages in 1982 to 10
percent in 1983.
The net effect of these legislative changes was a slightly
more progressive tax reduction for 1983 than that legislated for
1982. At the top, the marginal rate of 50 percent was not
lowered further. However, even top bracket taxpayers saw a
further tax reduction as inframarginal rates were cut still
further. Throughout the income distribution the lower rates of
1983 partially offset the value of the reductions of 1982 as the
tax reduction value of IRA contributions and the two-earner—— 27——
deductionwere reduced by the lower rates. On net, 1983 rules
produced a 22 percent tax reduction relative to those prevailing
before the tax cut.
The actual tax paid in 1983 was $8.3 billion higher than
predicted by TAXSIM. Virtually this entire revenue response
could be found in the top taxpayer group. This group, numbering
nearly 200,000 taxpayers in 1983, paid $31.7 billion in tax
instead of the predicted $23.5 billion. TAXSIM predicted that
under the old set of tax rules, these taxpayers would have paid
$29.0 billion in tax. As in 1982, it appears that these top
bracket taxpayers paid more taxes under the new lower rates than
was predicted they would pay under the higher set of tax rates
of the old law.
Also as in 1982. other taxpayer groups saw much more modest
changes in their tax liability relative to prediction.It is
useful to remember that for most types of income, the
constraints imposed in the baseline prediction mean that a
behavioral response for top taxpayer groups will cause lower
taxpayer groups to have a negative behavioral response. This is
evident in the 1983 data where taxes paid by the bottom taxpayer
group are lower than predicted. The revenue response for the
middle two groups is probably also understated.
There is also substantial evidence that the 1983 TAXSIM
revenue estimate is in line with Treasury calculations. The
1983 Budget of the United States estimated that the individual
income tax provisions of ERTA would cost $82.3 billion in
1983.17 This compares with TAXSIM's estimate of $74.4—— 28—-
billion.The Treasury estimate is high in part because of
excessive optimism about the state of the economy. Personal
income was predicted to be $51 billion or 1.8 percent higher
than it actually was that year. Although CBO estimates of the
Treasury model's margin of error ended in 1982, it is reasonable
to conclude from this budget data that the revenue response
relative to the Treasury model's estimate was roughly as great
as, or perhaps greater than, the response relative to the TAXSIM
model
1984. The tax cut of 1984 involved a reduction in tax rates
to 23 percent below their pre-cut levels from 19 percent in
1983. The IRA and two—earner deductions were continued at their
1983 levels. The third row in Table 2 again shows the scheduled
percent tax cut for all groups. The scheduled reductions
averaged about 26 percent, with middle income groups again
receiving the 1argest tax rate reduction.
A comparison of the predicted level of revenues with the
actual taxes paid shows that about $17.8 billion more was
collected than predicted by TAXSIM. Again, nearly all of this
revenue response could be found In the top taxpayer group.
These taxpayers actually paid $42.1 billion in taxes compared
with the $27 billion predicted by TAXSIM. As In 1982 and 1983,
the actual taxes paid by these taxpayers was more than TAXSIM
predicted would have been paid under the old tax law.
The revenue response was also apparent in the second
taxpayer group. Here, about $6.5 billion more was collected
than predicted by the baseline. This amounted to about 21—— 29-—
percentof the tax cut scheduled for this group. Other taxpayer
groups paid less than expected on net, with the most likely
explanation being the constraints imposed by the baseline
methodo logy.
In summary, the data regarding the revenue response indicate
that about one sixth of the total cost of ERTA over the period
1982—1984 was recouped. Due to the constraints imposed by the
baseline methodology, this is likely to be an underestimate of
the actual taxpayer response and it does not include any
feedbacks from macroeconomic effects of tax reductions.If
these factors are considered, the net revenue cost of the 1981
bill to the Treasury was probably far less than predicted.
The data also show that the revenue collected from the top
taxpayer groups was higher than the predicted level even given
the old set of higher rates and more stringent definition of the
tax base. This was true for each year after the reduction in
the top rate to 50 percent. This strongly implies that the
revenue maximizing top marginal tax rate is below the 70 percent
level which existed under earlier law.
B.Tax Rates and the Tax Base
The preceding section described the level of revenue
expected and actually received from different taxpayer groups.
This section explores that revenue relationship more closely by
comparing changes in the size of the tax base ——taxableincome
and the marginal tax rates imposed on the base. Table 3 shows
the level of taxable income and the average marginal tax rates
faced by taxpayers for a more detailed set of taxpayer groups.-- 30--
Table3
Differential Response of Taxable Income to Rate Cuts
Taxpayer Taxab1e Income Federal Tax Rate
Group & YearPredicted Actual % Change Baseline New Law
la 1982 10.79 14.89 +38.0 60.0 48.0
over 1983 12.59 19.73 ÷56.7 59.3 48.7
1000 1984 15.88 31.44 +98.0 59.1 48.4
lb 1982 8.38 11.04 +31.8 58.0 47.7
500— 1983 9.88 13.71 +38.8 58.5 49.4
1000 1984 11.01 17.52 +59.1 57.7 48.9
ic 1982 28.18 31.96 +13.4 55.2 48.6
200— 1983 31.34 36.60 +16.8 55.0 49.2
500 1984 37.15 45.31 +22.0 54.7 48.2
2a 1982 57.18 58.94 +3.1 50.8 48.2
100- 1983 61.99 63.72 +2.8 50.2 46.2
200 1984 74.23 78.87 +6.3 49.5 43.7
2b 1982 45.97 46.72 +1.6 46.1 45.5
75 -1983 54.18 54.35 +0.3 45.4 42.0
100 1984 67.04 68.58 +2.3 44.1 39.2
2c 1982 137.90 141.40 +2.5 39.3 39.9
50 —1983 163.40 166.10 +1.7 38.4 36.4
75 1984 210.70 216.60 ÷2.8 36.6 34.2
3a 1982 161.90 166.00 +2.5 32.6 34.4
40 -1983 180.30 181.30 +0.5 31.6 31.5
50 1984 210.00 211.70 +0.8 30.5 29.8
3b 1982 265.40 273.40 +3.0 28.1 29.2
30 -1983 284.90 288.40 +1.2 27.7 26.9
40 1984 304.40 306.30 +0.6 26.8 25.8
4a 1982 165.10 169.70 +2.8 24.9 26.3
25 —1983 162.50 163.10 +0.3 24.4 23.8
30 1984 172.00 168.20 —2.2 23.8 23.1
4b 1982 160.80 160.10 —0.4 23.0 24.4
20 —1983 168.90 161.10 —4.6 22.7 22.2
25 1984 170.60 161.60 —5.3 22.2 21.6
4c 1982 148.40 147.50 —0.6 20.5 21.4
15 —1983 158.50 151.00 —4.7 20.3 20.4
20 1984 170.50 161.90 —5.1 20.0 19.2
4d 1982 267.20 251.70 —5.8 11.9 12.1
under 1983 271.90 245.70 —9.6 11.9 11.4
15 1984 270.80 246.50 -9.0 11.2 10.8-- 31-—
Taxableincome is the base on which the income tax is
levied.It includes all forms of Income, less adjustments for
items such as Individual Retirement Accounts and the two earner
deduction and less the amount itemized deductions exceed the
zero bracket amount. Taxable income is also exclusive of
personal exemptions which depend on the number of people in the
tax filing household.
The definition of taxable income changed over the period as
provisions of the tax code changed. The primary cause of these
changes was the increase in the two—earner deduction for married
couples where both worked from 5 percent in 1982 to 10 percent
in 1983 and 1984.In all cases, the baseline level of taxable
income and the actual level of taxable. income to which it is
compared are based on the same definition. Furthermore, as
noted above, the taxable income levels for any taxpayer group in
any year are for identical numbers of taxpayers identically
situated in both the predicted and actual income distributions.
Two federal tax rates are also presented for each taxpayer
group. The baseline rate represents the pre-tax cut tax rate
which prevailed when the baseline income distribution was
created. This rate tends to decline slightly over time within
each taxpayer group because the group represents a relatively
poorer set of taxpayers in later years than In earlier years,
and under a constant tax regime would have a correspondingly
lower marginal tax rate. The new law tax rates represent the
rates actually faced by the taxpayer group In the year
specified. These rates also show a downward trend as a result
of the statutory tax cuts taking place over the period.—— 32--
Itis interesting to note that in some cases the actual tax
rate faced by a group Is higher than the baseline rate. This is
the result of "bracket creep" overwhelming the effect of the
statutory tax rate reductions. The rise in nominal Income over
the period caused taxpayers to enter higher tax brackets than
the one they were in when their baseline behavior was observed
in 1979. This effect is most pronounced in 1982, the first year
of the tax cuts, and less pronounced in later years as the
successive tax rate reductions Compensated for more of the
bracket creep of the period.
In all cases, the tax rate for each household represents a
weighted average of the taxpayer's marginal rate on earned
income and unearned income. Under old law, these differed due
to two provisions: the earned income credit, available to low
income taxpayers, and the maximum tax on earned Income, which
was available to upper income taxpayers18. Under the new law,
the earned Income credit was retained but the maximum tax was
abolished. The weight assigned to the earned income rate was
the share of wage, salary, and business or professional income
in Adjusted Gross Income. The unearned rate was assigned the
residual. Thus, the baseline tax rate for the top income groups
was well below the statutory maximum rate of 70 percent, but
above the 50 percent rate applying to some taxpayers' earned
Income.
For the sake of more complete analysis, an alternative set
of tax rates was also computed for each taxpayer. This
alternative set of rates included the effect of the Social-- 33--
SecurityTax paid by the employee and state income taxes as well
as the effect of the two-earner deduction provision for married
couples under ERTA.In this alternative, the tax rate under old
law was defined as:
(8) to =f0+er0+s0(1
—df0)
The federal tax rate in 1979, f0, was the same as defined in
table 3. The fraction of income represented by wages earned by
someone under the social security tax ceiling wage is
represented by e, and the social security tax rate prevailing in
1979 by r0 The wages of husbands and wives were separated
for computing effective social security taxes. Wage income for
each spouse was computed from actual tax return data on this
division by income class. A random number was assigned to each
jointly filed tax return to determine the allocation of wages on
that particular return based on the tax return data. A taxpayer
with wages over the social security tax ceiling was modelled as
being unaffected by the social security tax at the margin. The
taxpayer's state tax rate was defined by s and is computed
for each tax payer given his state of residence by the TAXSIM
state tax rate calculator.19 The effect of this state tax is
reduced by the deductibility of state taxes from federal taxable
income for taxpayers who itemize their returns. Thus, defining
d as the probability of a taxpayer in a given class itemizing,
this deductibility effect can be computed.-— 34——
Thetax rate under new law, isprovided by equation 9.
(9) t =+ er+sn(l—dfn)
—gw(1—f)
In this case, 1n represents the federal tax rate undernew law
for the year being modelled. The effect of social security
taxes is the same, except that the new social security tax
rates, r, prevailing in each year are used and the effect of
these on the margin, e, is based on the set of social security
tax ceilings prevailing in each year. State taxes are computed
in the same way, but updated to reflect the new state and
federal tax rates. Finally, the effect of the two earner
deduction is modelled by the last term. The proportion of total
income represented by the lower earning spouse's wages,
conditional on those wages being below the $30,000 ceiling for
deductibility, is represented by w. The amount of exclusion, 5
percent in 1982 and 10 percent in 1983 and 1984, Is represented
by g. This deduction is then valued at the marginal federal
rate. The distribution of income between the spouses was
determined by the same process as described above for
determining social security taxes.
The set of tax rates obtained by this procedure Is presented
in Table 4. The data show that the more comprehensive set of
tax rates shows a less progressive tax system than the federal
rates taken alone. The data also show that the effect of rising
social security tax rates, higher state income tax rates, and
bracket creep at the federal level overwhelmed the statutory tax—— 35——
Table4
Combined Federal, State, and Social Security Tax Rates
Taxpayer Total Tax Rate
Group Year Baseline New Law
la 1982 62.0 50.4
over 1983 61.3 51.2
1000 1984 61.1 51.2
lb 1982 60.0 50.2
500— 1983 60.6 52.0
1000 1984 59.9 51.7
ic 1982 57.8 51.4
200— 1983 57.5 52.1
500 1984 57.2 51.2
2a 1982 53.8 51.4
100- 1983 53.3 49.6
200 1984 52.6 47.3
2b 1982 49.8 49.1
75 — 1983 49.0 45.9
100 1984 47.9 43.5
2c 1982 43.5 43.9
50 1983 42.8 40.9
75 1984 41.1 39.1
3a 1982 37.4 39.8
40 1983 36.6 38.4
50 1984 36.0 38.2
Sb 1982 35.4 38.0
30 1983 35.0 36.1
40 1984 33.9 35.2
4a 1982 32.5 35.4
25 1983 31.9 33.0
30 1984 31.1 32.6
4b 1982 30.8 33.5
20 1983 30.2 31.5
25 1984 29.4 31.3
4c 1982 27.9 30.2
15 1983 27.4 29.5
20 1984 26.8 28.5
4d 1982 17.9 19.7
under 1983 17.5 19.2
15 1984 16.6 18.7—— 36——
ratereductions in the federal income tax for Most taxpayer
groups. Taxpayers with incomes below $50,000 faced higher rates
in 1984 than did identically situated taxpayers in the baseline
year of 1979.It should be noted however that in the absence of
the tax cuts mandated by ERTA, the actual tax rates faced by
these groups would have been even higher.
The net effect of all these tax rate calculations is to
produce a marginal tax rate which assumes marginal
equiproportionate increases in all forms of income received by
the taxpayer. Implicit in this choice of tax rates is the
assumption of no prior judgement regarding the response of
different types of' income to changes In marginal tax rates. Ex
ante judgements regarding the elasticity of particular
components of income with respect to tax rates would imply a
different weighting scheme for the effective marginal tax
rates.
C.Estimating the Effect of Tax Rates on Taxable Income
The basic model used to estimate the effect of tax rates on
taxable income was given by equation 4 and illustrated in figure
1:
(4) Y / \'1*= F(l—ti/ 1t*1)
The theory described in the first section does not provide
any particular specification of the functional form for this—- 37-—
analysis.In light of this, three sets of specifications are
considered. First, consider the assumption that all taxpayers
respond identically to equiproportionate increases in the share
of income they can take home at the margin. In this case, a
constant elasticity model of taxpayer behavior, as shown by
equation 10. is implied:
(10) Y / =(1—t1/ I —t*1)
A logrithmic regression specification was chosen:
(11) ln(Y1 / y*.) =a+Bln(1 —t1/1—t*1)+
C1
The interpretation of the intercept, a, is the
proportionate increase in personal income caused by the response
of taxpayers to lower tax rates. The coefficient, B, provides
the percent change in the tax base for every one percent change
in the share of marginal income the taxpayer is allowed to keep.
It therefore represents the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the after—tax share.
However, the data described in table 3 suggest that the response
of taxpayers to changes in their after-tax shares may rise with
income. Two possibilities are considered: that the elasticity rises
with the natural log of income and that the elasticity rises in
direct proportion with income. A behavioral specification of the
logrithmlc assumption is given by equation 12:
(12) 'i / i =(1-ti/ 1 —t*1)B
+y1nY-— 38--
Theregression, again done in logs in order to calculate an
elasticity, is:
(13) ln(Y. / y*) =a+t3ln(l_t1/1_t*1)+ylnY*ln(l_t1/1_t*1)
+C.
1
Inthis specification, the intercept term has the same
interpretation as above, but the elasticity of the tax base with
respect to the after tax share varies with income.
Finally, the possibility that the elasticity varies directly
with income is considered. Behaviorally the difference between
this assumption and the logrithmic assumption involves whether
taxpayer responsiveness rises with equal changes or equal
proportiona1 changes in income. The logrithmic assumption would
imply that the change in the elasticity is the same between
incomes of $20,000 and $40,000 as between incomes of $200,000
and $400,000. The alternative assumption is that the change in
elasticity is 10 times as great between the latter two income
levels as between the former two levels.
The equations describing the direct variation with income
are presented below:
(14) Y./y* =(1—t1I 1_t*i)B +IY*
The regression, again done in logs in order to calculate an
elasticity, is:—— 39--
(15)ln(Y1 / Y*i) =a+Bln(1_tj/1_t*j)+YY*ln(1_tj/1_t*1)
+ci.
Ineach case the regressions were performed using the data
presented above. The lowest income group presented on the
earlier tables was broken into three groups: below $5,000,
$5,000 -$10,000and $10,000 -$15,000thus providing a total of
14 observations for each year of data. The data was segmented
into a number of sets in order to examine the robustness of the
results.
The results from the constant elasticity specification are
presented in table 5. Table 6 presents the data from the
regressions where the elasticity varies with the natural log of
income and table 7 presents the results where the elasticity
varies directly with income. Each set of regressions uses the
data from 1982, 1983, and 1984 separately, from the 3 year
period 1982-1984 and from the 5 year period 1980-1984. In each
of the latter two cases regressions are run with and without
dummy variables for the various years.
The various specifications show that the assumption that tax
rates have an important effect on taxable income is robust.
Under the constant elasticity specification the elasticity of
taxable income to after tax share ranges from 1.05 to 2.75 with
most of the data suggesting an elasticity of between 1.6 and
1.8.In each case the elasticity with respect to the total tax
rate is below the elasticity with respect to the federal rate-— 40—-
Table5
Regression Results: Constant Elasticity Specification
Data Used Intercept Elasticity R—Sguare
1982 Only 0.003 1.143 0.867
Federal Rates (0.013) (0.129)
1982 Only 0.018 1.053 0.864
Total Rates (0.012) (0.121)
1983 Only -0.064 1.992 0.903
Federal Rates (0.017) (0.188)
1983 Only -0.023 1.709 0.864
Total Rates (0.018) (0.192)
1984 Only -0.089 2.750 0.871
Federal Rates (0.029) (0.306)
1984 Only —0.014 2.285 0.817
Total Rates (0.029) (0.312)
'82,'83 & '84 —0.038 1.837 0.773
Federal Rates (0.015) (0.158)
'82,'83 & '84 -0.002 1.624 0.758
Total Rates (0.014) (0.145)
'82,'83 & '84 * 1.845 0.778
Federal Rates (0.161)
Annual Dummies
'82,'83 & '84 * 1.625 0.764
Total Rates (0.147)
Annual Dummies
1980 —1984 —0.019 1.699 0.739
Federal Rates (0.009) (0.122)
1980 —1984 0.002 1.570 0.734
Total Rates (0.009) (0.115)
1980 —1984 * 1.801 0.757
Federal Rates (0.133)
Annual Dummies
1980 —1984 * 1.583 0.740
Total Rates (0.122)
Annual Dummies
Standard Errors in Parantheses.
*Interceptsvary with year. See text for details.-— 41——
Table6
Regression Results: Elasticity Varies with Log of Income
Data Used Intercept Elasticity R—Sguare
1982 Only -0.000 -1.71 +0.211lnY 0.895
Federal Rates (0.012) (1.68) (0.124)
1982 Only 0.007 —1.11 +0.164mY 0.888
Total Rates (0.014) (1.41) (0.107)
1983 Only —0.048 -2.84 +0.354mY 0.940
Federal Rates (0.016) (1.89) (0.138)
1983 Only -0.036 -2.58 +0.328mY 0.923
Total Rates (0.015) (1.56) (0.119)
1984 Only -0.051 -7.37 +0.755mY 0.970
Federal Rates (0.016) (1.68) (0.124)
1984 Only -0.047 —6.25 +0.671mY 0.946
Total Rates (0.018) (1.68) (0.132)
'82, '83 & '84 -0.029 —3.58 +0.402mY 0.822
Federal Rates (0.014) (1.65) (0.122)
'82,83 & '84 -0.019 -2.56 +0.322mY 0.805
Total Rates (0.014) (1.37) (0.105)
'82,'83 & '84 * —3.92+0.426mY 0.828
Federal Rates (1.77) (0.328)
Annual Dummies
'82,'83 & '84 * —2.65+0.328mY 0.812
Total Rates (1.40) (0.106)
Annual Dummies
1980 —1984 -0.013 -3.82 +0.410mY 0.788
Federal Rates (0.008) (1.40) (0.104)
1980 -1984 -0.007 —2.17 +0.285mY 0.772
Total Rates (0.009) (1.12) (0.085)
1980 —1984 * —3.87+0.419lnY 0.808
Federal Rates (1.50) (0.110)
Annual Dummies
1980 —1984 * —2.56+0.318lnY 0.784
Total Rates (1.16) (0.089)
Annual Dummies
Standard Errors in Parantheses.
*Interceptsvary with year. See text for details.—— 42—-
Table7
Regression Results: Elasticity Varies Directly With Income
Data Used Intercept Elasticity R—Sguare
1982 Only —0.003 0.970 +1.62Z 0.876
Federal Rates (0.013) (0.230) (1.79)
1982 Only 0.016 0.864 +1.93Z 0.878
Total Rates (0.013) (0.206) (1.71)
1983 Only —0.055 1.556 +4.24Z 0.924
Federal Rates (0.017) (0.305) (2.43)
1983 Only —0.024 1.219 +5.64Z 0.912
Total Rates (0.015) (0.268) (2.44)
1984 Only -0.064 1.680 +12.9Z 0.943
Federal Rates (0.022) (0.358) (3.47)
1984 Only —0.019 1.260 +15.3Z 0.932
Total Rates (0.019) (0.310) (3.56)
'82,'83 & '84 —0.033 1.491 +3.55Z 0.787
Federal Rates (0.015) (0.261) (2.16)
'82,'83 & '84 —0.004 1.260 +4.26Z 0.781
Total Rates (0.014) (0.220) (2.08)
'82,'83 & '84 * 1.496+3.52Z 0.792
Federal Rates (0.273) (2.26)
Annual Dummies
'82,'83 & '84 * 1.250+4.39Z 0.788
Total Rates (0.230) (2.13)
Annual Dummies
1980 —1984 —0.016 1.359 +3.56Z 0.753
Federal Rates (0.009) (0.209) (1.79)
1980 -1984 —0.001 1.230 +3.93Z 0.754
Total Rates (0.008) (0.180) (1.70)
1980 —1984 * 1.482+3.19Z 0.768
Federal Rates (0.227) (1.86)
Annual Dummies
1980 —1984 * 1.230+4.11Z 0.761
Total Rates (0.190) (1.74)
Annual Dummies
Standard Errors in Parantheses.
*Interceptsvary with year. See text for details.
z= V/10,000,000—— 43——
alone.This is as expected. As total rates are higher than
federal rates, a given percentage point change in the federal
rate will cause a larger percent change in the marginal take
home share after all taxes are included than after federal taxes
alone are included.
The specification where elasticity varies with the log of
income also shows a substantial elasticity for most levels of
income. The results imply a positive elasticity of taxable
income with respect to after-tax share in all cases for all
Income levels over $17,350.In most of the regressions a
positive elasticity is implied for all income levels over
$10,000. Thus a positive elasticity Is implied for the vast
majority of the tax base. The average elasticity implied for
taxpayers with Incomes of $50,000 is 0.728. This figure rises
to 1.023 for taxpayers with incomes of $100,000, 1.413 for
taxpayers with incomes of $250,000 and 2.003 for taxpayers with
incomes of $1,000,000.
The specification where elasticities vary directly with
income suggests positive elasticities in excess of unity for all
taxpayer groups. Again, an elasticity which rises with income
Is indicated, with elasticities of roughly 1.5 for taxpayers
earning between $50,000 and $200,000 and an elasticity of 1.9
for a taxpayer with income of $1,000,000.
In each specification the R—square term is roughly between
0.75 and 0.90, indicating that between three quarters and nine
tenths of the variation in the data is explained by the
regression. The R—square terms are highest in the case where—— 44—-
theelasticity varies with the log of income and lowest when the
elasticity Is invariant to income. This strongly implies either
that higher income taxpayers are more sensitive to after-tax
shares than are lower income taxpayers or that high income
taxpayers have income which is more subject to taxpayer
discretion than do other taxpayers.
The data also shows that regressions involving federal tax
rates alone have higher R-square values than regressions
involving total tax rates. At first this may seem puzzling
given an assumption of taxpayer rationality. But, there are a
number of explanations for this. First and foremost is that the
within—group variation in tax rates is greater for the total tax
rate measure than for the federal rate- alone. Not only do
taxpayers within any group face different state tax rates, they
also face different social security tax rates depending on the
sources of their income and their demographic characteristics.
An alternative explanation Is that both taxpayers and tax
advisers are more familiar with the implications of the federal
tax code than with state law and the social security tax
implications of taxpayer behavior.Reasons for this include a
cognitive focus on the primary tax ——thefederal income tax,
the existence of a national market in tax shelters which ignores
state rates in its operation, and the fact that the social
security tax rate overestimates the net effect of this tax by
the present value of additional social security benefits earned
at the margin.—— 45-—
Thedata also show that taxpayers were more sensitive to tax
rate changes at the end of this period than at the beginning.
An explanation of this is the natural delay involved in
rearranging portfolios and in renegotiating compensation
arrangements. Still, the rising sensitivity over the period
does not bode well for the hypothesis that the revenue response
we observe is a temporary phenomenon.
III. Interpreting the Results
The preceding section presented the results of three
specifications of the response of taxable icome to changes in
after tax shares. The elasticities indicated by the results of
these regressions can be used to estimate the revenue maximizing
tax rate and the intercept parameters can be used to estimate
the extra income which resulted from the tax cuts.
A. The Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate
Analysis of the implication of the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to after-tax shares for the revenue max-
imizing tax rate depends on the form of the tax rate schedule.
Consider first a proportional income tax levied at rate t.
If we define the elasticity coefficient from the regressions as n
thetax revenue from the proportional tax is a function of




Therevenue maximizing tax rate in this case occurs when the tax
rate is set at 1 / (1+ri).
Table 8 presents the values of the revenue maximizing rate
indicated by the regression results. The data implied that the
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the after-tax share
varied with the income level of the taxpayer. As a result,
table 8 shows the revenue maximizing tax rate at various income
levels. Three values are shown for each revenue maximizing tax
rate: maximum, average, and minimum. The maximum value
corresponds to the smallest elasticity found in any of the
regression specifications while the minimum value corresponds to
the greatest elasticity value. The average value is computed by
selecting the rate corresponding to the mean elasticity implied
by the various regressions.
In a variable elasticity model with higher elasticities at
higher levels of income, the revenue maximizing calculus depends
on the distribution of income. A revenue maximizing government
would calculate a tax rate where the revenue lost on higher
income, more elastic, taxpayers is just offset by increased
revenue on lower income, less elastic, taxpayers. As there is
more revenue to be lost on each high Income taxpayer than can be
gained from each low income taxpayer, the revenue maximizing
rate will be lower, for any given elasticity, than that implied
by equation 16. On the other hand, the results show that a
variable elasticity model will predict a lower elasticity than a
constant elasticity model.—— 47——
Table8
Estimated Ranges for Revenue Maximizing Top Marginal Tax Rate
Federal Tax Rate Total Tax Rate
Income Specification Max Avg Mm MaxAvg Mm
1,000,000Constant 46.7 34.9 26.7 48.7 38.0 30.4
Log of Income45.4 33.3 24.6 46.4 34.1 24.9
Income 46.9 34.5 25.2 48.6 36.3 26.4
250.000 Constant 46.7 34.9 26.7 48.7 38.0 30.4
Log of Income52.3 41.4 33.2 51.9 40.9 32.7
Income 49.7 39.2 33.3 52.3 42.8 37.9
100,000 Constant 46.7 34.9 26.7 48.7 38.0 30.4
Log of Income58.2 49.4 42.9 56.2 46.9 40.4
Income 50.4 40.3 35.6 53.1 44.5 41.4
50,000 Constant 46.7 34.9 26.7 48.7 38.0 30.4
Log of Income63.6 57.9 50.3 60.0 52.7 49.8
Income 50.6 40.7 36.4 53.4 45.1 42.8-— 48--
Animportant qualification to this calculation must be
stressed. This interpretation of the regession results for
computing a revenue maximizing rate assumes a proportional
income tax.It should be noted that a progressive tax would
imply a lower revenue maximizing top marginal rate. The rate
which maximizes revenue in the proportional case does so because
all income, including inframarginal income, is taxed at that
rate. Revenue maximization occurs when the marginal increase in
tax revenue on inframarginal income due to a higher rate just
offsets the marginal decrease in income from the higher rate.
If inframarginal income is taxed at lower rates, revenue
maximization would require a broader tax base and hence a lower
tax rate.
Given the usual objective of income tax progressivity, the
figures shown in table 8 represent upper bounds on the revenue
maximizing rate. Lower rates on lower income taxpayers also
mean that there are fewer low elasticity taxpayers on whom
revenue can be gained to offset the revenue lost on high
elasticity taxpayers at the top of the income distribution.
This means that the revenue maximizing rate must be set at the
rate appropriate to an income level which is higher than that
suggested above, implying a still lower rate. Given the U.S.
income distribution, and a desire to have lower rates on
taxpayers with incomes under $50,000, a revenue maximizing rate
should be set somewhere between the rate implied at a $250,000
income and that implied at a $1,000,000 income.—— 49-—
Giventhe data shown in table 8, this means that a top
federal tax rate in the vicinity of 35 percent, and a total tax
rate of about 40 percent, will produce the most revenue from
income taxation. A more progressive tax system than that
indicated by our current total tax burden would suggest revenue
maximizing rates below these levels.Interestingly, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 mandates an effectively proportional tax for
top bracket taxpayers, with both the average and marginal tax
rates set at 28 percent, but with lower income taxpayers facing
a marginal rate of 33 percent. This is consistent with the
revenue maximizing objectives described above.
An important caveat must be added to these results. As
noted in the introduction to this paper, the revenue maximizing
tax rate is not the socially optimal tax rate. Rather, it
provides an upper bound on the optimal tax rate.In all
likelihood there is an excess burden to the tax rate not
captured by the response of the tax base.In this event, the
socially optimal maximum tax rate is below the level suggested
here.
B. Baseline Bias and Growth in Personal Income
The first section noted that the baseline income
distribution was likely to be biased upward as it includes the
behavioral feedback from the tax rate reductions. As the
expected value of the ratio of actual to baseline taxable income
for someone with no change in tax rates is zero, any deviation
provides a measure of the amount of upward bias in the baseline.—- 50-—
Theregression results generally confirm the existence of this
upward bias. The intercept term in the regressions represents
the percent overstatement by the baseline when the intercept is
negative, and the percent understatement by the baseline when
the intercept is positive.
When 1982 data are run alone, no statistically significant
intercept term emerges. The average value of all six intercepts
implies an understatement by the baseline of 0.8 percent. On
the other hand, 1983 data run alone produces 4 statistically
significant intercepts out of 6.The average value of these is
—5.1 percent, while the average value of all six intercepts is
-4.2 percent. The 1984 data shows a similar result with 4
statistically significant intercepts having an average value of
—6.2 percent and all six Intercepts averaging —4.7 percent.
When the data from 1982-1984 are run together without annual
dummy variables, 3 of the six intercepts are significant with an
average value of —3.3 percent while all 6 intercepts average
-2.1 percent. The addition of annual dummy variables, none of
which is statistically significant, produces averages of -1.9
percent for 1982, -3.6 percent for 1983 and —0.8 percent for
1984.
The regressions involving all of the data from 1980—1984
have one statistically significant intercept of —1.9 percent and
an average va1ue of -0.8 percent. The inclusion of annual dummy
variables shows an average Intercept of zero for 1980, an
average value of +0.3 percent for 1981, and values of —1.7
percent, —3.5 percent and —0.5 percent for 1982, 1983, and 1984
respectively.-- 51--
Thefinding of a zero value for the intercept in 1980
confirms that the baseline replicated the actual result in a
year where there was no tax change. The small positive value in
1981 implies an understatement of the true economic situation by
the baseline. This would confirm the expectation, discussed in
section 1, that taxpayers would delay income in 1981 until 1982
to take advantage of the known lower set of tax rates that year.
These findings do not support the contention that tax cuts
by themselves produce any great surge in economic performance.
However, they do suggest that some extra economic activity is
attributable to the behavioral effects of tax rate reductions.
The fact that the intercept terms do not show substantially
greater values in 1984 than in earlier years suggests that the
tax cuts cause a sustained rise in the level of economic
activity, but only a temporary rise in the economic growth rate.
In effect, the extra factors of production which are bid into
service by higher after-tax compensation remain in place, but
the finite amount of productive factors in society limits the
total growth in output.
It is important to add that the finding of a negative
intercept implies that the revenue response described earlier in
the paper is an understatement of the true additional amount of
revenue obtained from the rate reductions. If, as this data
indicates, personal Income is about 2 percent higher than it
otherwise would have been, the income elasticity of the tax
system would convert this into about 3 percent more revenue, or
about $9 billion extra revenue each year.In the aggregate—— 52——
therefore,about one quarter of the non—behavioral cost of the
tax bill was recaptured by the revenue response. In terms of
the revenue loss from the rate reductions alone, the revenue
response amounted to about one third of the prospective cost.
C. Limitations on the Data
The regressions described in this section implIcitly ascribe
all of the deviation between actual and baseline taxable income
to the effect of rate reductions. It is important to recall
that the baseline includes most, but not all, of the economic
factors which might affect the distribution of income in a
particular year. For example, although the baseline controls
for the changes in the functional distribution of income in
society, it does not control for possible changes in the
distribution of individual components of Income.
These changes bias the baseline in either direction. For
example, It Is generally accepted that the deregulation of the
banking Industry and the advent of money market mutual funds
-extendedmarket rates of interest to a broader range of society
and therefore made the distribution of interest Income more
equal.. This would have the effect of having the baseline
overstate the interest income at the top of the income
distribution and therefore understate the behavioral response to
the tax rate reductions. On the other hand, the rise In
unemployment over the period may have had distributional
consequences not captured by increasing the sample weights of
tax returns reporting unemployment compensation.—— 53-—
Thus,the observation that all of the measured change in the
distribution of taxable income is ascribed to changes in tax
rates does not imply whether the actual behavioral response was
greater than or less than that described in the present paper.
The result hinges on whether the changes measured here were
greater than or less than those which actually occurred.—— 54--
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